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PRIORITIZING TRAFFIC: THE INTERNET FAST
LANE
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a cold winter night in February and you decide that it is a
good time to finally binge your way through House of Cards sea-
son three on Netflix. The season begins with the usual fourth wall
monologue and episode one finishes with another unexpected
twist. Netflix queues up episode two, but suddenly you receive a
notification that states: "High Speed Data Limit Reached." This is
where that crisp high definition quality video suddenly drops to
standard definition. That is until you call your Internet service
provider and pay the service charge for premium Internet service.
Now imagine it is the 2016 election season. You hear rumors that
a few of the candidates were involved in bribery. To verify these
claims you decide to check out one of the better known and unbi-
ased but small time news outlets. Suddenly, you receive a pop-up
notification: "Content Provider Limit Reached." Unfortunately,
this unbiased and reliable news source could not afford the Internet
service provider is premium services. These are only two exam-
ples of discrimination against a content provider. In Netflix is case
this is far closer to reality, as users have already experienced the
throttling' of their services.2 The latter example may be an ex-
treme, though the general scheme is simple. Larger businesses
that can afford to receive preferential treatment will prevail over
those smaller businesses that are unable to pay the premium.
In 2014, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pro-
posed an order, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet3,
which would alter rules originally provided by the 2010 Preserving
1. Throttling is when an Internet Service Provider slows down the data trans-
fer rate intentionally.
2. See NETFLIX, The ISP Speed Index From Netflix,
http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (Data ranges in-
cluded 24 months prior to this publication).
3. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 14-61, GN Docket No.
14-28 (2014) ("the new proposal").
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the Open Internet Order.4 The new proposal would alter key lan-
guage that previously prohibited an Internet Service Provider
("ISP") from unreasonably discriminating against the transmission
of lawful network traffic and would effectively allow ISPs to dis-
criminate against content providers.' In response, Congressional
members proposed The Online Competition and Consumer Choice
Act of 2014 ("the '14 Act"), which would compel the FCC to
promulgate regulations to ensure ISPs could not give preferential
treatment or priority of network traffic to one content provider
over another.6 The FCC proposal had been instigated by the recent
decision in Verizon v. FCC, whose opinion effectively neutered the
effects of net neutrality.7 However, the FCC only has itself to
blame as it had previously classified cable broadband providers
outside the scope of net neutrality.8
The FCC faced immediate backlash from the public and in par-
ticular strong net neutrality advocates. 9 Confusion, anger, and dis-
appointment were among the countless reactions from the online
community, which included a recent effort by content providers to
hold an "Internet Slowdown" day.'0 To understand the community
4. Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 25 FCC
Rcd. 17905 (2010) ("the 2010 Order").
5. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet at Appendix A § 8.7 (2014),
compare to Preserving the Open Internet at Appendix A § 8.7 (The change from
"no unreasonable discrimination" to "no commercially unreasonable practices"
allows ISPs to discriminate, as long as the FCC does not find it to be commer-
cially unreasonable, which thus far remains undefined).
6. The Online Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2014, S. 2476,
113th Cong. (2014). ("S. 2476").
7. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
8. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4824.
9. See Sam Gustin, Net-Neutrality Advocates Angered by FCC's New
Planned Rules, TIME. (April 23, 2014), http://time.com/74703/net-neutrality-
fcc-rules-plan-angers-advocates/ (discussing the changes and possible conse-
quences).
10. See John Brodkin, Big tech companies plan "'Internet Slowdown" to fight
for net neutrality, ARS TECHNICA. (September 4, 2014 3:35 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/big-tech-companies-plan-intemet-
slowdown-to-fight-for-net-neutrality/ (discussing an effort by several websites
to show their support for net neutrality by using large banners on their homep-
ages).
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response, factors such as the history of legislation and regulation
(or lack thereof) of broadband services, recent court decisions that
reflect the boundaries the FCC may work within, and the potential
impact on ISPs, content providers, and the end user must be exam-
ined.
In section II, the necessary background information will be dis-
cussed. The 1996 Telecommunications Act ("the '96 Act") was
the first form of legislation to include Internet services, it would
cover broadcasting and telecommunications, and most notably it
established the foundation for the FCC is regulations. " The major-
ity opinion in Brand X secured the FCC is regulatory ruling on
broadband services, an issue with its own muddled past.'2 The
2010 Open Internet Order codified the concept of net neutrality,
the shining light in this dimly lit hallway of legislation, regulation,
and private interests. 3 The Verizon case blew the fuse on the bulb
of the 2010 Order, as the Court would deny the FCC is ability to
impose net neutrality.' 4 The final piece of background is the cur-
rent proposal, touted by the FCC as being in line with net neutrali-
ty principles, contrary to the basic tenets of net neutrality. 15
Section III focuses on the proposed legislation, S. 2476. The
legislation pinpoints a single issue, in an attempt to rectify the Ver-
izon decision and properly codify a major principle of net neutrali-
ty. Section IV begins an analysis of the situation. Beginning with
the impact of the FCC is proposal; the possible positives and nega-
tives are summarized from differing viewpoints. Aside from S.
2476, a solution called upon by much of the public is discussed,
the common carrier classification. A parallel is drawn from anoth-
er telecommunication service, mobile broadband. Common mis-
conceptions are briefly discussed, as some content providers con-
tinue to face obstacles, they have begun taking the road less
11. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
12. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967 (2005).
13. Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 25 FCC
Rcd. 17905 (2010).
14. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
15. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 14-61, GN Docket
No. 14-28 (2014).
2014]
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traveled, though it is a well-known road that runs in and out of the
scope of net neutrality, the use of content delivery networks. Pres-
ident Barack Obama recently spoke on the subject, urging the
common carrier solution, however the effectiveness of his spon-
sorship is up for debate. Finally, section V concludes the overall
discussion with a summarization of the situation and the possible
routes the Internet will venture in the near future.
II. BACKGROUND
Before considering the current proposed legislation, pertinent
technology must be examined. Net neutrality is the principle that
all data transmitted over broadband is to be treated equal; Profes-
sor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School popularized this principle in
2003.16 The general notion of net neutrality can encompass several
different aspects, below is a discussion on the particular definition
of net neutrality as it pertains to this article. Generally, it would
require that all content providers must have open access without
fear of discrimination from an ISP.'7 By 2005 the FCC had estab-
lished its own principles, which would lay the groundwork for the
2010 Order.'8 The four key principles revolved around the con-
sumers,
... To ensure that broadband networks are widely
deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all
consumers, the Commission adopts the following
principles:
- To encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and inter-
connected nature of the public Internet, con-
sumers are entitled to access the lawful In-
ternet content of their choice;
16. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
17. Id.
18. Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, FCC 05-151, 20 FCC Rcd 14986 (2005).
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- To encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and inter-
connected nature of the public Internet, con-
sumers are entitled to run applications and
use services of their choice, subject to the
needs of law enforcement;
- To encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and inter-
connected nature of the public Internet, con-
sumers are entitled to connect their choice
of legal devices that do not harm the net-
work; and
- To encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and inter-
connected nature of the public Internet, con-
sumers are entitled to competition among
network providers, application and service
providers, and content providers. I9
These principles were derived from notions of net neutrality and
the general policies underlying the '96 Act.20
The '96 Act, the 2010 Order, and the new proposal all refer to
ISPs and content providers. However, there are many variants to
the terms used; as technology develops, terminology changes form
until settling on the most common usage. Broadband service pro-
vider is mostly interchangeable with Internet Service Provider,
while the same applies to edge providers who are more commonly
referred to as content providers. An ISP, such as Comcast, Ca-
blevision, Verizon, Time Warner or COX, supplies the highway
for which all the data travels upon while charging a general toll.
The data (or content) itself primarily originates from content pro-
viders, such as Netflix, YouTube, Google, or Amazon. Da-
ta/content can also originate from end users, who are essentially
the consumers of the ISP.
19. Id., (internal citations omitted).
20. Id. at 3 note 14.
2014]
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A. Network Neutrality
Net neutrality is a broad term. What does neutral mean in terms
of Internet service? Does it only apply to the end user, the content
provider, the ISP, or a combination? Where do content delivery
networks factor in? This article constrains net neutrality to the ef-
fect on content providers and end users by the broadband provid-
ers' efforts to prioritize traffic. Most importantly, an end user
should have equal access to all lawful content, while a content
provider should be able to provide content at an equal rate to all
consumers without fear of an ISP discriminating to provide a third
party with prioritized access.
The underlying policy of net neutrality consists of promoting
fair evolutionary competition in the realm of the Internet.21 In or-
der to successfully execute fair evolutionary competition, ISPs
must not make content choices for the end user. The prioritizing
of traffic will force the end user towards the content provider that
the ISP deems fit, in other words the content provider who pays
the highest fee. This will sound reminiscent to Content Delivery
Networks (CDNs), discussed below, and many academics will
give CDNs the rubber stamp of being anti-net neutrality.22 How-
ever, that requires one to apply a broad definition of net neutrality
that would effectively categorize CDNs as a type of ISP. Focusing
on S. 2476, this article discusses net neutrality violations by local
ISPs when delivering content to the end user, by way of prioritiza-
tion of content providers.
B. The 1996 Telecommunications Act
1. Beginning with the Communications Act of 1934
The origination of the FCC began with the Communications Act
of 1934 ("the '34 Act"). 23 Enacted by President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt during the New Deal, the Communications Act brought reg-
21. See Wu, supra note 16.
22. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Conges-
tion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1882 (2006).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 151 etseq.
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ulation to telephone and radio communications via the FCC.24 It
would take Congress sixty-two years before amending the '34 Act,
by enacting the '96 Act.25 The purpose of the amendment was to
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure low-
er prices and higher quality services for American telecommunica-
tions consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new tele-
communication technologies. 26
2. Title II of the '96 Act
The '96 Act made an important distinction between telecommu-
nication services and information services. 27 Two categories were
defined: basic services of telecommunication carriers and en-
hanced services of information service providers. 28 The distinction
would allow for Title II common carrier regulations to be applied
to those deemed telecommunication carriers. 29 This would lead to
an increase in competition between telecommunication services,
where smaller telephone service providers would compete by rent-
ing infrastructure to provide their own services; it would also en-
sure a standard level of quality for the consumer. Title II of the
'96 Act provided several regulations for any party deemed a com-
mon carrier, including making it unlawful for a common carrier to
engage in unjust or unreasonable discrimination.30 The implication
being that the larger and well established utility services could not
discriminate against smaller businesses or consumers, which
would provide an even competitive field for all those who ven-
tured into the market.
24. Id.
25. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996).
26. Id.
27. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 630.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (51).
29. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975-76.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a).
2014]
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C. National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. BrandX
Internet Services
In response to the growth of cable broadband, the FCC issued a
Declaratory Ruling stating that ISPs were an information service
and therefore not subject to the Title II regulations of the '96 Act.3'
The Supreme Court in Brand X would later uphold this 2002 De-
claratory Ruling.32
In Brand X, small-time ISPs attempted to classify broadband
service providers as common carriers in order to maintain an even
playing field.33 During the dial-up days of the Internet, because
several ISPs had access to phone lines, they were regulated under
Title II as a common carrier, more commonly referred to as a pub-
lic utility.34 Essentially, services such as AOL and CompuServe
could rent phone lines laid by other companies.35 To maintain a
competitive edge against the growing cable broadband providers,
these small ISPs sought to use the telecommunication infrastruc-
ture established by the cable companies who began offering high-
speed Internet access, they would essentially piggyback on the in-
frastructure.3 6 Without compelling cable providers to sell access to
their networks, the smaller dial-up based ISPs began to dwindle.37
Essentially, these smaller ISPs could no longer piggyback on the
pre-built infrastructure, without which their services were unnec-
essary. By 2005, only 28% of adults connected to the Internet via
dial-up while currently the number is less than 3%.38
31. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802-4803, P9 (2002). ("Declaratory Rul-
ing").
32. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1002.
33. See id., at 967.
34. Id, at 974.
35. Id.
36. See id., at 975.
37. See Joanna Brenner, 3% of Americans use dial-up at home, (August 21,
2013), Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/08/21/3-of-americans-use-dial-up-at-home (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
38. Id.
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In deciding Brand X, the Ninth Circuit relied upon stare decisis
of its own ruling in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland.3 9 In Portland,
the Ninth Circuit determined broadband service providers were a
telecommunications service, which it reaffirmed in BrandX, there-
fore adhering to its precedent. 40 While the Supreme Court took
note of the FCC not being a party to the suit in Portland,41 it
should be noted here that the FCC still filed an amicus brief in
Portland.42 In the FCC is amicus brief, it is clear that it did not
take a specific position on the matter, but instead it encourages the
Ninth Circuit to construe narrowly and take note of "agency
preemption," where the FCC believes their declarations may pre-
vail.43 In light of this, the Ninth Circuit acted accordingly, with the
agency silent on the matter the Ninth Circuit interpreted 47 U.S.C.
§ 153 to include cable modem broadband Internet service.44
It was only after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Portland that the
FCC classified broadband service providers as an information ser-
vice in its Declaratory Ruling.45 In the Declaratory Ruling, the
FCC relied on its findings in Universal Service Report.46 The Uni-
versal Service Report focused on non-facilities-based ISPs, those
who did not own the facilities used but merely provided the Inter-
net service, deeming them information service providers because
they did not own the physical transmission facilities. 47 Using the
Universal Service Report, the FCC declared cable companies that
offered broadband services to likewise fall under an information
service.4 8
As mentioned above, the FCC failed to take a stance in its ami-
cus brief in Portland, even though the Universal Service Report
39. See AT&T, Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Id., at 880.
41. BrandX, at 980.
42. See Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae, AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d 871.
43. Id.
44. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 880.
45. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802-4803, P9 (2002).
46. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd.
11501, 11531, P63 (1998) ("Universal Service Report").
47. See id.
48. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 973.
2014]
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had already been published. The FCC's Declaratory Ruling only
established the agency is "preemptive" decision following the
Ninth Circuit's ruling. It is clear that the FCC's intent here was to
override the Ninth Circuit's decision, subordinating the jurispru-
dence to its own interests in what can be considered a power re-
served to Congress, though this specific discussion could write an
article of its own.
The Court in Brand X ultimately held that Chevron deference
required a federal court to accept an agency's construction of a
statute, even if it would differ with a court is best statutory inter-
pretation.4 9 The Supreme Court is resident administrative law ex-
pert, Justice Scalia, dissents for clear and convincing reasons.5 0
Aside from the obvious telecommunicative aspects of broadband
Internet service (voice, video, and textual communication via the
Internet), Justice Scalia points to the majority is possibly unconsti-
tutional creation: subjecting judicial decisions to reversal by exec-
utive officers. 1 The implications of this case would extend be-
yond net neutrality, as it was applicable to all agencies, but it was
clear here that the power was in the FCC's hands. This very im-
portant notion is returned to below, though the FCC is reaction is
far less constructive. It is the FCC is own stance here that broad-
band service is an information service, that would cripple its own
attempts to serve the public needs in the near future (using Title II
regulations on a telecommunication service), though once again
the Courts do provide the FCC with the power to make change.
D. The 2010 Open Internet Order
As discussed above, in 2005, the FCC established four major
principles of the open Internet.5 2 Later, the 2009 address of then-
FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski to the Brookings Institute in
49. Id. at 980 (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844,
n. 11 (1984). Here, Chevron deference refers to the Courts deference to an
agency's interpretation of statutes unless the interpretation is unreasonable).
50. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1005-20 (Justice Saclia, dissenting).
51. Id. at 1016-17 (Justice Saclia, dissenting).
52. FCC, supra note 18.
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Washington followed.53 In his address, the Chairman wished to
supplement the four principles with two more, transparency and
(our focus here) nondiscrimination. 4 The Chairman was targeted
the throttling of traffic, whether specific protocols or content pro-
viders.5 The address was in response to the holding in Comcast v.
FCC.56 The FCC had attempted to censure Comcast is unwarrant-
ed throttling of peer-to-peer network services following complaints
from several of its subscribers.57 The Court in Comcast held that
the FCC's orders to cease the discrimination of traffic were not a
proper "statutorily mandated responsibility" under its ancillary au-
thority, while simultaneously informing the FCC of an alternative
route of relief under other titles of the Communications Act. 8 The
FCC would then deliberate and eventually promulgate the 2010
Order.
The section of the 2010 Order involved in these recent events
centers on the "no unreasonable discrimination" section, and
states:
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broad-
band Internet access service, insofar as such person
is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate
in transmitting lawful network traffic over a con-
sumer is broadband Internet access service. Rea-
sonable network management shall not constitute
unreasonable discrimination. 9
The key language resides in the terms "shall not unreasonably dis-
criminate." This provision echoed the Chairman is additional open
53. See Nate Anderson, FCC Chairman wants network neutrality, wired and
wireless, ARS TECHNICA. (September 21, 2009 10:39am),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/fcc-chairman-wants-network-
neutrality-wired-and-wireless (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 644-45.
58. Id. at 646, 661.
59. 47 CFR § 8.7 (2010) (emphasis added).
2014]
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Internet principle, non-discrimination. 60 At the time and as it cur-
rently stands, this ensures that ISPs cannot allow favoritism of any
one content provider over another. As Comcast had previously
shown, ISPs were already willing to subvert traffic for its own
gain, and it would not be long before they would take action
against the 2010 Order.
E. Verizon v. FCC
In January 2014, the D.C. Circuit struck down the anti-
discrimination rule established by the 2010 Order. 6' It is important
to clarify that the Court did not eliminate the 2010 Order. To the
contrary, the Court held that the FCC had properly interpreted its
statutory mandate under 47 U.S.C. § 1302 in that it may promul-
gate rules governing the treatment of Internet traffic by broadband
service providers. 62 The issue arose with regards to the previous
classification of broadband service providers, discussed above in
Brand X.63 The D.C. Circuit emphasized that due to the previous
classification of broadband service providers as an information
service, the FCC could not impose regulations reserved statutorily
for Title II common carriers. 64 The implication here, as it was in
Comcast, was that the FCC had the authority to impose the 2010
Order upon common carriers; all that remained was reclassifica-
tion of broadband service providers as a public utility, that is, a
telecommunication service falling under Title II common carrier
regulations. As mentioned, the FCC took a stance that would deny
them the ability to impose the 2010 Order.
In a statement on February 19, 2014, the current FCC Chairman,
Tom Wheeler, ultimately decided not to appeal the decision .6 The
Chairman explained that the FCC would return to the net neutrality
rules, and revise them in order to effectively enforce them follow-
60. Anderson, supra note 53.
61. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659.
62. Id. at 641.
63. FCC, supra, note 3 at 4802-03; BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1002.
64. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650.
65. See Statement by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on The FCC's Open In-
ternet Rules, § 3 (February 19, 2014).
12
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss1/5
NET NEUTRALITY
ing the Verizon ruling.66 The Chairman also explained that the
FCC is Title II authority was still "on the table," implying that the
FCC would reclassify broadband service providers as a last re-
sort.6 7 This implies that the FCC may attempt a hybrid policy, one
that may prohibit discrimination; though it is unclear how the FCC
could impose non-discrimination without reclassification, under
Verizon. Reclassification is where the major contention lies. It is
the simplest answer to this issue, an answer that the Courts implied
would allow for proper imposition of net neutrality, however the
FCC has been reluctant in asserting this authority, with theories
ranging from litigation scare and lobbying demands. 68
F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking GN Docket No. 14-28
As discussed above, the current language of the 2010 Order
states, ".... [ISPs] shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmit-
ting lawful network traffic."69 The current proposal by the FCC
targets this language, altering the provision and specifically read-
ing, ". . . [ISPs] shall not engage in commercially unreasonable
practices. '70 This boils down to the objective principle of net neu-
trality (no discrimination) in contrast to a subjective standard fo-
cused on commercial application (and whether the FCC deems a
commercial practice reasonable).
The essence of this change is embodied in what is known as the
Internet fast lane, as dubbed by the media. By allowing ISPs to
engage in commercially reasonable practices, content providers
may become subject to an increased fee to offer a quality of ser-
vice expected of them. From a more nefarious perspective, ISPs
could intentionally throttle content providers until they complied
with tariffs on bandwidth, or completely rule out the use of one
66. See FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler, Statement on The FCC's Open Inter-
net Rules, preamble (February 19, 2014).
67. See id.
68. See Kate Cox, ISPs to FCC: No, Seriously, We Will Sue If You Use Title
II, Consumerist (November 10, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/11/10/isps-
to-fcc-no-seriously-we-will-sue-if-you-use-title-ii-like-the-white-house-j ust-
asked (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
69. 47 CFR § 8.7 (emphasis added).
70. FCC, supra note 3.
2014]
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content provider in lieu of its own services. Critics prefer to call
the prioritization of traffic the Internet slow lane.71 The distinction
is important, as the fast lane implies that one route will be faster
with no consequences to the remaining traffic. The slow lane ap-
proach takes into account the effect of a prioritized lane on the re-
maining traffic.72 As many experts have predicted, including Pro-
fessor Wu, the originator of net neutrality, any fast lane
(prioritized) would negatively impact the remaining traffic leading
to slow lanes.73 The FCC has thus far stood by its pending pro-
posal, claiming that it is still in line with net neutrality principles,
albeit without any justification.7 4 However, the principles estab-
lished by the FCC in the 2010 Order prohibits discrimination of
traffic; the implication of a prioritized delivery system, though to
be reasonable, is no different from discriminating against other
traffic. 7
5
G. Public Comments
Following the new proposal the FCC sought public input on its
proposed rules to help determine the best viable approach to pre-
serving an open Internet. 76 Initially, the FCC planned to take in
comments for two months. 77 Overwhelmed by the initial com-
71. See Katheryn Thayer, Tim Wu Makes A Bid For Net Neutrality, FORBES
(June 17, 2014 9:22am),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/katherynthayer/2014/06/17/tim-wu-makes-a-bid-
for-net-neutrality/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
72. See Tim Wu, The Solution To The F.C.C. 's Net-Neutrality Problems,
THE NEW YORKER (May 9, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-solution-to-the-f-c-c-s-net-
neutrality-problems (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
73. See id
74. FCC, supra, note 3.
75. FCC, supra, note 4.
76. FCC Launches Broad Rulemaking On How To Best Protect And Pro-
mote The Open Internet, FCC News (May 15, 2014),
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-launches-broad-rulemaking-protect-and-
promote-open-internet (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
77. Id.
14
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menting period, which heralded over 780,000 comments, 7 the
FCC ultimately extended the commenting period until September
15, 2014.79
Controversy erupted when the FCC released its initial comment
count.8 0 Public (and possibly private) interest groups took to ana-
lyzing all the data the FCC publicly provided.8' Initial claims were
that anti-net neutrality comments heavily outweighed pro-net neu-
trality comments, until some groups noticed over half a million
comments were missing. 2 Both sides of the debate made claims
that the loss of comments was detrimental to their respective
viewpoints.83 In order to clear the air, the FCC published an in-
formational post on its website to address the issue.
8 4
Initially, the FCC had taken comments through its website but
was unable to manage the volume of commenters.85 The FCC then
allowed individuals to comment via e-mail.8 6 With multiple meth-
ods of communication in place, comment data appeared in multi-
78. See Gigi B. Sohn and David A. Bray, Setting the Record Straight on
Open Internet Comments, FCC (December 23, 2014 11:22am),
http://www.fcc.gov/blog/setting-record-straight-open-internet-comments.
79. See Wireline Competition Bureau Extends Deadline For Filing Reply
Comments In The Open Internet And Framework For Broadband Internet Ser-
vice Proceedings, GN Docket No. 14-28, 10-127 (2014).
80. See Nancy Scola, More than half a million net neutrality comments went
missing from the FCC's downloadable public record, THE WASHINGTON POST
(December 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/12/23/fcc-confirms-that-680000-net-neutrality-comments-were-
missing-from-the-public-record/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
81. See Andrew Pendleton and Bob Lannon, One group dominates the sec-
ond round of net neutrality comments, Sunlight Foundation (December 16, 2014
1:23pm), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/12/16/one-group-dominates-
the-second-round-of-net-neutrality-comments/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
82. Id.
83. See Karl Bode, FCC States It Misplaced Around 600,000 Net Neutrality
Comments, DSLReports.com (December 24, 2014 11:52am),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/FCC-States-It-Misplaced-Around-
600000-Net-Neutrality-Comments- 132102 (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
84. See Sohn, supra note 78.
85. Id.
86. FCC Establishes New Inbox for Open Internet Comments,
http://www.fcc.gov/page/fcc-establishes-new-inbox-open-intemet-comments
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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pie formats.87 In delivering this information to the public, the FCC
ran into technical difficulties.88 In a notice to the public, the FCC
explained how 680,000 comments were unaccounted for in the in-
formation delivered via XML files.89 Although these comments
were not in the XML files, the comments were appropriately
counted for in its original Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS).90 Ultimately, the FCC estimates that the total count has
reached nearly 4 million, in line with what had been predicted by
the public interest groups. 91
The sheer volume of individuals commenting on the proposed
rules is reflective of the crucial importance of net neutrality.
While there have been concerns of special interest groups attempt-
ing to bolster their agenda by encouraging commenting, this is
mostly true of each side of the debate.92 The Internet has become
an essential to education, employment, and social activity. Net
neutrality seeks to ensure that the Internet remains a place where
all individuals may take the opportunity to enjoy and make use of
the Internet is limitless potential, without their Internet service
provider interfering. For these reasons, the public has been very
outspoken on the issue. It is possible that without the implementa-
tion of net neutrality principles, even those who have hoped to
comment against net neutrality could face an uphill battle in hav-
ing their voices heard.
87. Pendleton, supra note 81.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Nancy Scola, Dirty data: Why the '4 million public comments'on net
neutrality might not be what they seem, THE WASHINGTON POST (December 18,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/dirty-
data-why-the-4-million-public-comments-on-net-neutrality-might-not-be-what-
they-seem/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. S. 2476- "The Online Competition and Consumer Choice Act
of 2014'"
The proposed legislation, sponsored most notably by Senators
Leahy, Franken, and Sanders, was drafted in direct response to the
regulation proposed by the FCC. Several members of Congress
took immediate notice of the Verizon decision, and subsequently
the non-response by the FCC. The legislation in pertinent pro-
vides,
SEC. 2. FCC REGULATIONS PROHIBITING
CERTAIN PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OR
PRIORITIZATION OF INTERNET TRAFFIC.
(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall
promulgate regulations that-
(1) prohibit a broadband provider from entering into
an agreement with an edge provider under which
the broadband provider agrees, for consideration, in
transmitting network traffic over the broadband In-
ternet access service of an end user, to give prefer-
ential treatment or priority to the traffic of such
edge provider over the traffic of other edge provid-
ers; and
(2) prohibit a broadband provider, in transmitting
network traffic over the broadband Internet access
service of an end user, from giving preferential
treatment or priority to the traffic of content, appli-
cations, services, or devices that are provided or
operated by such broadband provider, or an affiliate
of such broadband provider, over the traffic of other
content, applications, services, or devices.93
93. The Online Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2014, S. 2476,
113th Cong. (2014).
2014]
17
Syed: Prioritizing Traffic: The Interest Fast Lane
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 151
The prohibition on preferential treatment or priority treatment
would reestablish one of the anti-discrimination principles of net
neutrality. The bill is very straightforward; the FCC must regulate
broadband service providers by imposing anti-discrimination poli-
cies.94 The implication that follows from the previous case law
lends to the FCC being congressionally mandated to reclassify
broadband service providers, so they may effectively order anti-
discriminatory rules against all ISPs.
B. Defeating the Subjective Standard
The FCC proposal sets out to adjust net neutrality by leaving it
susceptible to subjective reasoning. As stated in the proposal, the
FCC may deem certain practices commercially unreasonable. 95
Those efforts to prioritize traffic that are deemed commercially
reasonable would not be found in violation of net neutrality. From
this several questions arise such as: (1) what is commercially un-
reasonable; (2) will these decisions be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis; and (3) will there be any further standards from which con-
sumers can anticipate and accordingly decide which ISP to prefer.
Predictions of countless litigation stemming from this subjective
standard are not unfounded, where ISPs have already engaged in
litigation over regulatory rules. 96 The effect on consumer choice is
also severe, limiting the decisions of consumers via the ISP's abil-
ity to discriminate. 97 Here, it is only possible to defeat the subjec-
tive standard by providing an objective solution: an anti-
discrimination policy that treats all traffic equal.
94. Id.
95. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet at Appendix A § 8.7.
96. Verizon, 740 F.3d 623.
97. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet at Appendix A § 8.7.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Possible Implications of "Pay-for-Priority"
Supporters of the fast lane assert the initiative as driving innova-
tion.98 As broadband service market penetration increases, conges-
tion will increase. As users increase, Internet traffic will only con-
tinue to rise. Technological innovation leads to higher quality
content e.g. 4K-resolution video content. This requires a wider
highway, to avoid congestion and allow traffic to freely move.
Those ISPs who prioritize and provide tiered service can then
strengthen their networks without passing the cost directly to con-
sumers. Otherwise, the networks stay congested as each player
blames the other for failing to strengthen the backbone.
While it can be said that competition would drive consumers
away from those ISPs who do not develop a stronger infrastruc-
ture, many ISPs have contracts with municipalities that provide
exclusivity to certain areas. 99 Those consumers do not have a
choice, and those consumers amount to nearly seventy-five percent
of all broadband users.00 However, this deals with the concept of
regulatory capture and lobbied gains. The most primary example
of these oft-mentioned forms of corruption lies in the FCC Com-
missioner, and those of the past. There has been a long record of
cable industry lobbyists that have helmed the seat of Chairman. 10
It would seem counterintuitive to appoint an individual friendly to
98. See Letters from Congress to Thomas E. Wheeler, to Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission (May 15, 2014).
99. See Allan Holmes, How big telecom smothers city-run broadband, The
Center for Public Integrity (August 28, 2014 5:00am),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/08/28/15404/how-big-telecom-smothers-
city-run-broadband (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
100. See Grant Gross, FCC's Wheeler: US needs more high-speed broad-
band competition, PCWORLD (September 4, 2014 10:26am),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2602723/fccs-wheeler-us-needs-more-
highspeed-broadband-competition.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
101. See Lee Fang, Net Neutrality Kabuki Theatre: How Cable Companies
Dominate the Debate, Vice (July 18, 2014), http://www.vice.com/read/net-
neutrality-kabuki-theater-how-cable-companies-like-comcast-gamed-the-
comment-process-718.
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the very industry they are meant to regulate. Though, it should be
noted that the FCC has shown interest in ensuring these exclusivity
contracts do not stop municipalities from developing their own
broadband service networks. 02
The implications of the proposed rules provide broadband ser-
vice providers with the ability to offer priority access to those will-
ing to pay for the extra service. 10 3 This has been argued to inevita-
bly cause any "standard" access edge providers to slow down.10 4
With priority given to those corporations that can afford it, start-
ups who are unlikely to be capable of paying for priority access
step into the world at an inherent disadvantage. The implications
of this are clear with fewer start-ups developing into successful
companies that pose a real competitive threat to the larger compa-
nies, ultimately hurting competition and narrowing consumer
choice.
B. Solutions
1. S. 2476
The proposed legislation would be an effective solution by
providing a specific provision to prohibit prioritization of any web
traffic. 05 It would restrict ISPs from playing favorites with content
providers, particularly those who competed with the ISP itself,
such as an ISP is OnDemand service and Netflix. 106 ISPs that hap-
pen to provide services other than Internet may favor their own
services over competitors, in providing bandwidth or Internet ser-
vice. ISPs such as Verizon could throttle Netflix to cripplingly
102. See Jon Brodkin, State laws that ban municipal Internet will be invali-
dated, FCC Chair says, Ars Technica (April 30, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/04/state-laws-that-ban-municipal-intemet-
will-be-invalidated-fcc-chair-says (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
103. See FASTLANE, Welcome to the Fastlane, http://jointhefastlane.com (A
parody website, showcasing the possible implications of the "no commercially
unreasonable practices" rule) (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
104. Thayer, supra note 71.
105. The Online Competition and Consumer Choice Act of 2014, S. 2476,
113th Cong. (2014).
106. Id. at § 2(a)(1).
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slow speeds, forcing their customers into using Verizon is own
RedBox. In the most extreme case, an ISP may force users to use
their own search engine or pay a premium to use Google. The an-
ti-discrimination provision in S. 2476 would prevent ISPs from
prioritizing traffic and enforce the requirement of equality amongst
content providers. However, even with Congressional authoriza-
tion the Courts have implicated that in order to impose net neu-
trality-like regulations, the FCC would have to re-classify ISPs.
Essentially, S. 2476 may ultimately require the FCC to re-classify,
which brings us to the common carrier solution.
2. Common Carrier
A common carrier is defined as, "a commercial enterprise that
holds itself out to the public as offering to transport
[goods/services] for a fee.' 7 They are generally required by law
to transport [goods/services] without refusal.'08 As defined, public
utilities are effectively common carriers. Under Title II of the Tel-
ecommunications Act, telecommunication services are common
carriers.'09 As mentioned above, broadband service providers are
currently classified as an information service, but reclassification
of broadband service providers as a telecommunication service is
the single best solution.
Title II provides a laundry list of regulations, applicable to all
telecommunication services.10 However, many of these regulations
are essentially bans against bad behavior, such as discrimination
against a content provider, rather than restrictions on doing busi-
ness.' For example, as a Title II telecommunication service ISPs
must charge just and reasonable nondiscriminatory rates to their
customers; design their systems so other carriers may interconnect
and make use of their backbone network; and contribute to the
universal service fund under 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) among other obli-
107. Common Carrier Definition, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009),
available at WestlawNext.
108. Id.
109. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-231.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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gations. 2 The FCC could then exercise the ability to properly
regulate and monitor broadband service providers. This opportuni-
ty would allow for the FCC to impose net neutrality in its fullest,
spurring innovation and progress while promoting competition.
Critics of this solution claim this may lead to overly burdensome
regulation, with the assumption that it may stifle innovation. 13
These critics fail to recognize that innovation is currently being sti-
fled by the lack of competition, and any allowance of an ISP to fa-
vor its own services would further detract newcomers. Net neu-
trality is not typical regulation. Regulation is thought to bind
activity, reigning in an unstable market. However, net neutrality
simply requires all activity to be treated equally, providing an even
playing field while giving consumers the power of choice. Reclas-
sification of broadband Internet as a telecommunication service
under Title II common carrier regulations would help continue the
growth that has been expected of the information technology in-
dustry.
3. Debate over the Effects of Title H Reclassification
Most recently, the discussion surrounding net neutrality has fo-
cused on Title II reclassification." 14 Anti-net neutrality advocates
have claimed that reclassification of broadband services, as a tele-
communications service, would lead to a heavier burden on con-
sumers."5 Specifically, a study by the Progressive Policy Institute
(PPI) has estimated a $15 billion increase in user fees across the
112. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975.
113. See Gautham Nagesh, House Republicans Say FCC Net Neutrality Laws
Are Unnecessary, Overreach, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 20, 2014
3:49pm), http://online.wsj.com/articles/house-republicans-say-fcc-net-
neutrality-laws-are-unnecessary-overreach-1403293782 (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
114. See Adi Robertson, Qualcomm, Intel, and others speak out against Title
H net neutrality, THE VERGE (December 10, 2014 12:53pm),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/10/7370009/qualcomm-intel-and-others-
speak-out-against-title-ii-net-neutrality (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
115. See generally Title II: Net Disaster, Not Net Neutrality (available at,
https://www.ncta.com/TitielI, last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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United States."6  The policy brief by PPI has already been de-
bunked and labeled, colorfully, as "bullshit."" 7
PPI's policy brief claims that under Title II, Internet services
will become subject to new federal and state fees." 8 In particular,
PPI mentions that state and local municipalities will generate new
fees and taxes, and that the cost will be shifted onto consumers as
it has historically with other telecommunication services. ",9 To be
clear, what PPI is implying may have very well be true, but they
fail to mention why Internet services will become subject to these
new costs under Title II. The answer to that question lies in the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA).'2 0
The ITFA was signed into law in 1998 and prohibited state and
local governments from taxing Internet services.' 2 ' Since it is en-
actment, the ITFA has been extended four times, with the most re-
cent extension occurring on December 16, 2014 under a $1.1 tril-
lion government spending bill more commonly referred to as the
Cromnibus spending bill.'2 2 The PPI policy brief was published on
116. See Robert Litan and Hal Singer, Outdated Regulations Will Make Con-
sumers Pay More For Broadband, Progressive Policy Institute (December 1,
2014), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/slider/outdated-regulations-will-make-
consumers-pay-broadband/.
117. See Mike Masnick, Senator Ron Wyden Calls 'Baloney' On Claim That
Title 11 Will Increase Taxes On Your Internet Bill: 'I Wrote The Law', TECHDIRT
(December 19, 2014 6:14am),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20141218/14392329482/se
nator-ron-wyden-calls-baloney-claim-that-title-ii-will-increase-taxes-your-
internet-bill-i-wrote-law.shtml.
118. See Robert Litan and Hal Singer, Outdated Regulations Will Make Con-
sumers Pay More For Broadband, Progressive Policy Institute (December 1,
2014), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/slider/outdated-regulations-will-make-
consumers-pay-broadband/.
119. See id.
120. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999., 105 P.L. 277, Title XI.
121. Id.
122. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2015, 113
P.L. 235, see also, Grant Gross, Internet tax moratorium extended in Cromnibus
spending bill, COMPUTER WORLD (December 15, 2014 12:39 pm),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2859709/intemet-tax-moratorium-
extended-in-cromnibus-spending-bill.html.
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December 1, 2014123, prior to the recent extension, and reflected a
supposed outcome of an expired ITFA (which would have oc-
curred in December 2014). 24 As mentioned, the ITFA has seen
extension after extension, and efforts have also been taken to es-
tablish a permanent moratorium with the most recent effort having
passed the House on July 16, 2014. 25
In response to the PPI study, Senator Ron Wyden clarified that
the ITFA would still be effective, regardless of whether Internet
services were classified under Title 11.126 As author of the ITFA,
Senator Wyden is definitely an appropriate source for determining
whether or not the ITFA will apply to a Title II telecommunica-
tions service. Senator Wyden is clarification on the ITFA, com-
bined with the consistent extensions of the IFTA, cut strongly
against PPI is findings.
The $15 billion increase could only occur under two major as-
sumptions. First, the moratorium provided by the ITFA would
have to lapse with failure of all renewal attempts; and second,
costs would have to be shifted to consumers. Without the first as-
sumption, the second is moot, but even if we assume the IFTA ex-
pired cost shifting may not occur under the new Title II circum-
stances. As discussed above, under Title II ISPs would have to
allow the use of their backbone networks. 127 We can infer that this
would provide more competition, certainly more than what exists
today128, because third parties would gain access to providing their
own services via the backbone networks. The increase in competi-
123. Robert Litan and Hal Singer, Outdated Regulations Will Make Consum-
ers Pay More for Broadband (December 2014), available at,
http://www.progressivepolicy.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
124. See Masnick, supra note 117.
125. Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act, H.R. 2086, 113th Cong. (2014)
126. See Senator Ron Wyden, Protecting Net Neutrality Will Not Invalidate
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Ron Wyden Senator for Oregon (December 18,
2014), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/protecting-net-neutrality-
will-not-invalidate-internet-tax-freedom-act.
127. Pendleton, supra note 81; BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975.
128. See Grant Gross, FCC's Wheeler: US needs more high-speed broad-
band competition, PCWORLD (September 4, 2014 10:26am),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2602723/fccs-wheeler-us-needs-more-
highspeed-broadband-competition.html.
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tion will likely lead to competitive pricing, therefore any increase
in cost may essentially be cured.
However, it is important to note that ISPs under Title II could be
subjected to federal taxation under the Universal Service Fund
(USF). 2 9 If reclassified under Title II, the FCC has the ability to
impose fees to provide additional funding to the USF.130 Recently,
the FCC has planned to increase the current fees imposed, in an ef-
fort to increase funding to help provide broadband Internet access
to schools.' In the same vein, the USF is funded by all telecom-
munications services and is not required to impose a fee on Inter-
net services. 32 Essentially, the FCC has the option to impose a
nominal fee to help provide services for the public good, a fee that
is already imposed (on current telecommunication services) and
does not immediately require further funding.
When addressing concerns of Title II regulations, the source of
regulation (the related statute) is critical. Similar to the taxation
issue, many of the rules and regulations that affect the Internet are
already in place. ' Any purported "new" fees or taxes are typical-
ly arising out of previously established statutes. "14 Extrapolating
from other telecommunication services can be misleading because
of the current lack of competition in the broadband industry, and
the likely increase in competition from reclassification. Unfortu-
nately, debate over the effects of reclassification will continue un-
til the FCC enacts its new rules.
C. Content Delivery Networks
First, we should address important terminology. A content de-
livery network (CDN) is a dynamic network, a data center that
129. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
131. See Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Chief Aims to Bolster Internet for Schools,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (November 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/1 7/business/fcc-chief-aims-to-bolster-
intemet-for-schools.html.
132. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
133. See Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, 105 P.L. 277, Title XI.
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
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sends, receives, and stores information from content providers. 3 5
They provide redundancy for content providers while also shorten-
ing the distance between the end user and the content.'36 A peering
agreement between two services'37 establishes direct interconnec-
tivity between the networks of those services, historically cost-free
and for mutual benefit.'38 The last-mile is a phrase that refers to
the line that connects the ISP to the end user, and where an Inter-
net query usually starts.
As an example let us assume website-A has its original data
stored on a server in New York. A user in Switzerland wants to
access website-A and a query begins at the last-mile. The Switzer-
land ISP will direct the query towards website-A is servers in New
York"'39 and when accessing the information the user will feel the
delay due to the great distance between the content and user as
well as congestion from all users who access the same content
from the same server. To avoid this problem, website-A will con-
tract with a CDN. The CDN will have servers all over the globe,
in our example we'll assume the CDN has a server located in
Norway. Website-A will store its data on the CDNs Norway serv-
er. Now, when the user requests website-A the Switzerland ISP
will direct the query to the Norway server diminishing delay and
easing congestion. Keep in mind, when thousands of users are ac-
cessing content all over the world, a CDN (with servers all over
the globe) will have a copies of content to provide to users in close
proximity.
At the most basic level, a content delivery network violates net
neutrality. 140  A CDN charges a fee to certain content providers
then it will provide the content to an ISP (which will be a separate
135. See Yoo, supra note 22 at 1881-82.
136. Id. at 1882.
137. For the article is purposes, we assume the two services are a content
provider and an ISP.
138. See Yoo, supra note 22 at 1871.
139. This is a major simplification of the Domain Name System, for a great
summarization; see Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Do-
main Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361,
1366.
140. This requires a very broad definition of net neutrality, as discussed
above.
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agreement). This, to some extent, prioritizes content, but without
CDNs many users will suffer from a content provider is inability to
deliver its content in a reasonable fashion. Aside from CDNs, con-
tent providers (and other network services) can establish peering
agreements with ISPs. In the past, peering agreements were typi-
cally cost-free, however most of these agreements have become
costly with the increase in data, network size, and technology.
1 4
'
The direct interconnection of networks between a content provider
and an ISP provides the best scenario, but this is not feasible for all
content providers. Peering agreements are also maintained by
CDNs, allowing for strong interconnection between all parties.'
42
Whether by CDN or by peering, these agreements are meant to
provide content and service at higher speeds and better quality.
However, it cannot be said for certain that any cost shifting to-
wards consumers is an effect of net neutrality violations. These
agreements are the cost of doing business, in efforts to provide the
end user with content, and have an expectation that consumers will
bear the burden.
Recently, Netflix established a peering agreement with Comcast
to alleviate congestion that affected the end user experience.1 43
However, the activity of congestion is suspicious and should be
noted. Prior to the negotiations, Netflix experienced degradation
in the service they provided to their customers using Comcast.' 44
The average data transfer suddenly fell over 25% from January
2013, with a miraculous increase of 24% from the average days
141. Jay P. Kesan and Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You- Fool Us
Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Inter-
net Backbone Network and Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 89, 148.
142. See Mark Taylor, Observations of an Internet Middleman, Level 3 (May
5, 2014), http://blog.level3.com/open-internet/observations-intemet-middleman.
143. See Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay Comcast for Smoother
Streaming, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (February 23, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579401071892041
790.
144. See Max Ehrenfreund, This hilarious graph shows the importance of net
neutrality, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 24, 2014),
http://knowmore.washingtonpost.com/2014/04/25/this-hilarious-graph-of-
netflix-speeds-shows-the-importance-of-net-neutrality.
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following the agreement with Comcast.14 5 This is evidence that
lends to the idea that Comcast purposefully degraded the service of
Netflix, in order to strong-arm it into an agreement it found suita-
ble. 146
There is also controversy over whether congestion at the last-
mile is fabricated by the ISPs, and that the ISPs should bear the
burden of further developing infrastructure to avoid any conges-
tion.'47 Unfortunately all members involved play the blame game,
with the upper hand going to the ISPs, for now.
D. Priority Interests in Cellular Networks
When the 2010 Order was promulgated, the FCC treated mobile
broadband with a much softer hand. Mobile broadband was ex-
cluded from the entirety of the anti-discrimination provision and
only required to refrain from blocking applications that would
compete with their own voice or video services. 48 Although, FCC
Chainnan Tom Wheeler has expressed dissatisfaction with recent
claims of throttling mobile broadband by Verizon. 149  Wheeler
mentions that mobile broadband has changed significantly since
the 2010 Order. 150 A prime example of change is the current dis-
criminatory practices by cellular carriers. An average consumer
may consider it a feature, but T-Mobile is "Music Freedom" is a
blatant violation of net neutrality.
145. Id. at graphic, percentatge change in Netflix download speed since Jan.
2013, by I.S.P.
146. More evidence is Netflix's Open Connect Initiative
(https://openconnect.itp.netflix.com), a peering agreement Netflix offers to all
ISPs at no cost; an agreement Comcast essentially refused.
147. See Mark Taylor, Observations of an Internet Middleman, LEVEL 3
(May 5, 2014), http:/iblog.level3.com/open-intemet/observations-internet-
middleman.
148. See Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, FCC 10-201, 25
FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010).
149. See Brian Fung, Your mobile data could be soon covered by net neutral-
ity, THE WASHINGTON POST (September 10, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/10/your-mobile-
data-could-be-soon-covered-by-net-neutrality.
150. See id.
178
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T-Mobile, partially owned by Europe's Deutsche-Telekom, be-
gan exempting certain radio applications from their consumer's
data allotment."' Content providers such as Pandora Radio, Spoti-
fy, and iTunes Radio, no longer affect the data allotments of T-
Mobile consumers and the list continues to grow.'52 Now consum-
ers who were weary of using Internet radio can enjoy it at no extra
cost. This seemingly innocuous "feature" for customers is precise-
ly the type of activity S. 2476 wishes to protect against for in the
cable broadband realm.
While beneficial to consumers, this business practice is some-
what disingenuous. The current data-allotment-exempt content
providers essentially have a leg up on smaller competition. The
realm of mobile applications has been a playground for several
start-ups. Now as far as Internet radio is concerned, start-ups will
have a difficult time overcoming the inherent advantage of those
well-established exempt content providers. Unless T-Mobile pro-
vides a policy to treat all data equally, start-ups will be deprived of
a fair playing field, while consumers will have limited choices.
E. Presidential Response
Recently, President Obama took a clear stance on the subject of
net neutrality.53 The President advocated for reclassification of
broadband service providers as a public utility under Title II com-
mon carrier regulations. 54 In 2007, then Senator Obama, took a
similar stance.'55 Unfortunately, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler
would not take as strong a stance. In response to the President is
statement, the Chairman expressed his opposition to the fast lane
(which his commission proposed) while refraining from stating a
Title II solution, but reserved possible hybrid solutions of its own
151. See T-Mobile Sets Your Music Free, Press Release (June 18, 2014).
152. See id.
153. See generally http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality.
154. See id.
155. See Tony Romm, Obama's past stance in conflict with net neutrality
proposal, POLITICO (April 24, 2014 7:13pm),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/net-neutrality-fcc-barack-obama-
10601 1.html.
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regulations and Title 11.156 The public is quick to note however,
that President Obama did appoint Tom Wheeler, the former CEO
of the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association and
President of the National Cable & Telecommunications Associa-
tion.
V. CONCLUSION
Net neutrality is a simple concept. Internet service providers
should not discriminate against content providers. Consumers who
pay for use of the provider is telecommunication services are the
sole arbiters of what content they wish to lawfully access. ISPs
build the highway and charge a toll; content providers fill it with
valuable information sought by consumers.
As discussed above, in response to the immediate public reac-
tion to the recent proposal, the FCC invited public comment on the
proposal.'57 In the course of the open comment period, the FCC
received over 4 million comments.158 The sheer level of public re-
sponse and the President is own statements to the proposal should
make the answer clear to the FCC. Re-classification of ISPs as
common carriers would provide the public with non-discriminating
broadband service and equal access to all content providers. Con-
sumers will have the power of choice and greater competition will
exist within the industry.
The consumer is ability to choose ISPs has already been devas-
tatingly strangled, with fewer than 15% of all US residents having
the option to choose from more than one provider.15 9 The Internet
is a tool by which individuals from around the world and of all ag-
es obtain knowledge. Where non-regulation could have provided
robust competition, lobbying has brought us to the point where we
156. See FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler's Statement On President Barack
Obama's Statement Regarding Open Internet, FCC News (November 10, 2014).
157. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 14-6 1, GN Docket
No. 14-28, Appendix A § 8.7 (2014).
158. See Gigi B. Sohn and David A. Bray, Setting the Record Straight on
Open Internet Comments, FCC (December 23, 2014 11:22am),
http://www.fcc.gov/blog/setting-record-straight-open-internet-comments.
159. Gross, supra, note 128.
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must codify non-discriminatory policies. 160 Net neutrality is vital
to innovation and progress and the power of choice must remain
with individuals. In order to preserve, protect, and promote an
open Internet, net neutrality is essential.
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160. Holmes, supra, note 99.
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